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Abstract
In this paper we consider the output level of equilibrium in Cournot
duopoly game with perfect information. It is known that there is first
mover advantage in perfect information Cournot game with no external
economy and total output level of the game equilibiria is smaller than it
of Stackelberg game. But this is not true in Cournot or Stackelberg
duopoly game with perfect information if there is external economy on
one firm or both firms of duopoly firms. In this case, because of positive
sloped reaction curve of the firm with external economy, Stackelberg
equilibrium point locates on the left side or right side to Cournot
equlibrium point. Therefore Stackelberg leader can or can not increase
his production lebel from it of Cournot-Nash equilibria through the best
reply curve.









































































































































































































C2(x1,x2)＝c2 x2－e2 x2 x1 (17)
π1＝(a－b(x1＋x2))x1－c1 x1 (18)























































































































































































C1(x1,x2)＝c1 x1－e1 x1 x2 (29)




π1＝(a－b(x1＋x2))x1－(c1 x1－e1 x1 x2) (31)
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